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Interviewer: So today is July the 22nd, 2013. We are here in Vancouver, on a 
very beautiful and sunny afternoon, with Professor Mark Warren, who kindly accepted 
to receive us in his house for an interview. 
We are going to start by discussing a question related to the very nature of our 
work as political theorists. Professor, in a text from 1989 discussing the current state of 
Political Theory, you started by affirming that the subfield of Political Theory used to 
be misunderstood within Political Science. Many works in the area adopted, some way 
or another, a poor dichotomy between normative and empirical theory as if their 
purposes, methods and range were completely different. The behaviorist agenda 
reflecting a sort of new positivist form of explanation tended to oppose a speculative 
theory, considered part of the history field or of Human Sciences, to a hard, empirical 
theory that could be confirmed or refuted by observable data. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, there used to be a pretension or a 
claim that the second way of doing theory should replace the former one. 
 
Mark Warren: Well, you've done a nice job of summarizing. Today, the field of 
Political Theory is pretty exciting and well integrated into Political Science, but not too 
long ago that wasn't the case at all. Sometime after the World War II, Political Science 
began to consolidate around a view according to which the discipline could be 
analogous to the natural sciences, and that Political Science really needed to find its 
Newton or maybe even its Copernicus. This is the idea that was expressed beginning in 
the 1960s in the Behavioral Revolution, a revolution that continued through the 1970s, 
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and then in another way in a formal theory that really got started in the 1970s, and 
that continues into this day. These scientific agendas haven't gone away, but they've 
been re-contextualized, I would say. And they have been re-contextualized, in part, 
because the discipline of Political Science is fundamentally normative. The phenomena 
that we call political are phenomena that are, in part, constituted by normative 
questions. 
To quote Max Weber, he wrote in his famous essay “Politics as a Vocation” that 
there were really two important questions. I'm going to quote loosely because I can't 
remember the exact quote. But it is something to the effect of "We need to know what 
we should do and how we should live." These are the political questions par 
excellence. 
Political Science remained healthy as a discipline, in part, because it continues 
to be normative in this sense. And the explanatory parts of the discipline, today, are 
nicely contextualized, at least on average, within important normative questions. The 
questions having to do with democracy, with representation, with political trust, with 
exploitation, domination, with questions of justice, questions of race, racism, 
questions of inclusion, exclusion. These are all, of course, the topics of Political Theory, 
and these topics are the topics that keep the explanatory questions – questions that 
are framed by these types of issues – alive and well and healthy. 
But this is a fairly recent development, this understanding of Political Science 
and Political Theory's role within it. Political Theory as a discipline came out of the 
history of political thought. And in so far as it came out of the history of political 
thought it was the study of old and canonical texts. And so it had much more in 
common with the humanities than with explanatory sciences, the kind that was 
developing in Psychology and Economics, in particular, and, into a lesser degree, in 
Sociology. 
Empirical Political Scientists were asking in the 1960s and 70s why a humanistic 
way of understanding politics belong to the Political Sciences at all. And through the 
1960s and 70s, at least in the Anglo-American world of Political Science, Political 
Theory was progressively marginalized. But this process also coincided with the rise of 
the Civil Rights Movement in the US, the rise of feminism, with the development of 
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ecological and green political thinking, with questions of war and peace, with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989, with the progressive demise of ideologies that were 
alternatives to democracy. 
So the world conspired, we might say, to bring the normative questions back 
into Political Science. And the process of marginalizing Political Theory within Political 
Science was, to some degree, successful and the number of Political Theory positions 
in Political Science declined through the late 1970s and into the 1980s. But political 
theorists really reinvented themselves, partly in response to criticisms from empirical 
political scientists, partly in response to world events of the type that I've just been 
mentioning. And it became through this period more issue-focused, more topical, 
more – you know I hate to use the term – but more relevant; it became more relevant 
and re-approved or newly approved the case for Political Theory within Political 
Science. And I think that's where we are today. The case's been made. Political Theory 
is focused on things that people care about, it serves as a kind of normative envelope 
that helps to argue for or to cast the relevance of explanatory problems. 
 
Interviewer: So, you're arguing that theoretical research nowadays share with 
empirical studies the ambition to reduce the complexity of the political world in order 
to make it more manageable as an object of study. And this was not the case a few 
decades ago. We know that one important development in the subfield of Political 
Theory was due to the model-based theories that emerged in the mid-1900's. Can you 
tell us what was the role of the models of democracy and other theoretical 
frameworks in this new form of understanding and relating with Political Theory? 
 
Mark Warren: The idea of models in democracy was one of the first responses 
to the history of political thought. The idea came from C.B. Macpherson, who was at 
the University of Toronto. He developed the idea and defended the idea that there 
were different complexes of ideas having to do with democracy that could be 
analytically modeled and then studied in the form of models. 
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The approach was quite influential because it made the history of political 
thought relevant to emerging political ideals. It allowed a kind of critical focus on the 
history of political thought, and it enabled the history of political thought to interface 
with other forms of Political Science, theories of representation, theories of electoral 
systems, theories of elite selection, theories of complexity in governance. And it was 
firmly successful in drawing these bridges between Political Theory and Political 
Science. 
My opinion, however, is that the idea of models of democracy has probably 
outlived its usefulness now. One of the ways in which the models were developed used 
the following strategy: People who think in models typically think about “a” problem. 
The problem of community, in the case of republicans, the problem of the lack of 
participation, in the case of participatory democrats, or the problem of engaged 
citizenship, the problem of deliberative decision making, in the case of deliberative 
democracy. Now, in each case models tend to be built around one kind of problem. But 
it is certainly the case that democratic systems, good democratic systems, have to 
accomplish a lot of different tasks. They need to solve problems of inclusion/exclusion, 
they need to form, deliberatively, collective wills that people can recognize as part of 
their own, that people can justify to one another. And they need to make decisions. 
They need to make decisions often using mechanisms such as voting. 
So I think it turns out that if we look at what democratic systems need to 
accomplish functionally and normatively, no single model captures all of these things 
that need to be done. For this reason, what we should probably go back to, what we 
should rediscover, is the “systems thinking”; we should try to recast systems thinking 
in a way that is normatively adequate. That is, every time we ask about a function, we 
need to ask what the purpose of the function is and then we need to justify that 
purpose normatively. That is the link that will bring systems theory back in the 
conversation with normative democratic theory. And I think it will allow us to move 
beyond models-based departure. 
 
Interviewer: Allow me to interrupt you here because I want to go back to this 
point later. So let me ask you about something else, about an issue that you have been 
Leviathan | Notes on Political Research N. 8, pp.151-169, 2014 
 
 
 
155 
 
working with for a long time and that has been occupying a prominent place within the 
subfield of Political Theory. Over the latest years, Political Theory, in general, and 
theories of democracy, in particular, have broadened their scope and developed 
sophisticated methods to understand and organize political work. 
Deliberative democracy has certainly a prominent place in such quantity and 
quality increase. Since Habermas' critique of the decadence of the bourgeois public 
sphere, deliberative theory had experienced an astonishing proliferation having given 
birth to a diversity of approaches, several empirical research programs and other 
innovative institutional designs. 
In part, deliberative democracy is an alternative to orthodox theories of 
democracy that sustained a view of society centered in the state, which used to reject 
the idea of common good and think of democracy as solely a method for choosing 
between political elites. 
How does deliberative democracy represent a paradigmatic change in 
democratic theory? And what elements does it bring to the table that improve our 
understanding about politics and society? 
 
Mark Warren: You’re absolutely right. The theory of deliberative democracy 
came on the scene fairly quickly and robustly from a number of different sources, 
especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and was proved to be an incredibly 
productive research paradigm in democratic theory. It has its historical origins, of 
course, that are quite old, going back to Aristotle’s Politics and then, in some ways, 
recaptured by democratic republicans like Thomas Jefferson, recast by liberals like 
John Stuart Mill, updated in the American context by Dewey and so on. So deliberative 
democracy is not new but it was newly named and enabled the rediscovery of these 
traditions. 
Now, in part, the reason why deliberative democracy came on the scene as a 
model on the Political Theory research program, is related to what happened to 
mainstream theories of democracy, which have been colonized mostly by 
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institutionalist and behavioral political scientists. They placed elections in the heart of 
democracy. 
Deliberative democracy is not an alternative to elections, but it refocuses on a 
basic truth about democracy. Democracy is about changing the medium through which 
political conflict is conducted – from fighting through coercion and weapons to talking 
and voting. Democracy is a kind of medium shift with respect to political conflict. 
The voting-based theories of democracy, while important – they remain 
important and it is impossible to think about democracy without all of these 
mechanisms –, pushed aside this important idea of shifting medium in the way that 
political conflict is conducted. And, in doing that, these theories marginalized ideas 
that are incredibly important to the legitimacy and viability of democracy. The 
development of common solutions to problems that people can recognize as their 
own; the giving and receiving of reasons; the attentiveness to the fact that other 
people have other ways of thinking about controversial political issues; the 
motivational force that follows from reason and reason-giving. 
So deliberative democracy is able to talk about legitimacy and political 
judgment in a way that institutionalist and voting-focused accounts of democracy 
could not. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that the reemergence of this process of valuing the 
argumentative dynamic is also related to the political events that went on during the 
late 1970s and during the early 80s? You mentioned before the emergence of the 
feminist movement, for example. 
 
Mark Warren: That’s an interesting question. I think that there are a number of 
events that, I would say, coincided in the late 1980s and early 90s to push this 
paradigm of democracy. One in the set of events were the events associated with the 
emergence of the New Left, those issue-focused transformations – feminism, civil 
rights, anti-racism and so on and so forth. Up until the fall of the Berlin Wall, these 
events sat side by side in the Western World with older forms of Socialism and 
Marxism or other essentially class-based approaches. The Cold War had tended to 
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freeze conversations about democracy into the choice of either a kind of electoral 
representative democracy represented by the allied victors in World War II or 
Communism. And because this was the kind of hegemonic dichotomy, there was no 
real reform space for much of the New Left. And the Old Left, sided often very 
uncomfortably with authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian ideas, that by 1989 had 
proved themselves unviable. That, I would say, in post World-War-II period, but they 
were clearly unviable by the time the Berlin Wall fell. 
Now, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this was a challenge to the democratic 
Left, they were pushed to reinvent themselves and to become more politically 
relevant. That introduced a new sort of reformist thinking. The reformist thinking that 
had always had a kind of strain in Europe in revisionist Marxism, in Socialism in the 
German Socialist Party and so on and so forth. But now connected with the New Left in 
the post-1989 world. And there was a deficit of good theoretical models, and it was 
into that deficit that the idea of deliberative democracy stepped, pulling together 
strains of participatory democratic theory with big questions about justice and 
injustice, racism, anti-racism and so on and so forth, and packaged this into the idea 
that we’ve got to talk about political and moral questions; we need to inject 
normativity into the political systems that we actually have. We can’t be utopian about 
this. To be utopian is to be regressive rather than progressive, to do nothing when you 
could be doing something. The medium for doing something is a combination of 
pressure and talk. And I think that’s what propelled the idea of deliberative democracy 
into the position that it began to take up in the late 1990s. 
 
Interviewer: Among the recent developments in the deliberative field of 
democratic theory, I’d like to highlight the rediscovery of the systemic approach that 
you have mentioned earlier. Basically, this perspective views democracy as a complex 
and differentiated political system in which different institutional mechanisms should 
be used to address specific problems. In this sense, distinct forms of participation – 
vote, deliberation, protests – perform different functions within democratic societies. 
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Why does the model way of thinking cannot properly address the problems of 
legitimacy posed by modern democracy? And in what ways does the systemic 
approach is capable of overcoming such difficulties? 
 
Mark Warren: Maybe to back up a little bit…For those of us who came out of a 
kind of participatory radical democratic tradition, we were faced with the problem or 
the challenge that to be good, engaged citizens under contemporary conditions there 
is a very high bar. Our societies are diverse, they’re complex, they’re large-scale, and 
so some of us have been trying to imagine how strong ideals of citizenship could fit 
with these kinds of societies. 
Some of the models that we inherited – participatory democracy in particular, 
but in some other ways the model of deliberative democracy – pose ideals that were 
very difficult to realize, at least in the general or in the abstract sense under the 
conditions, or within the kinds of societies that we now have and that we’ll certainly 
have in the near future. 
We could continue to think in ways that are relatively abstract and utopian and 
insist on strong participation wherever we can get it, a strong deliberation wherever 
we can get it, and that’s probably a good thing to do. But I think we also need to ask 
how we can realize these kinds of ideals under contemporary conditions. And when we 
do that, we need to start thinking about divisions of labor. We need to imagine – well, 
imagine is what I think is in fact the case – that each citizen has a certain number of 
participatory resources, a certain amount of participatory resources, and really these 
resources don’t stretch very far when you think about all the things that affect each 
citizen in complex, large-scale societies. 
So can we think about how citizens might be able to maximize these resources? 
How could they direct these resources toward the areas that really count, the areas 
that are really important? 
But to think in that way, again, is to imagine a kind of complex division of labor 
in which the citizens are doing one thing at one time and another thing at another 
time. They are counting on fellow citizens or they are counting on representatives, or 
they are counting on associations to look after this issue or that task. 
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When you start posing those questions, you move into the area of systems. And 
this amounts, I think, to a rediscovery of a system’s theory which actually has quite an 
old history that came back from Aristotle, Marx, David Easton, Talcott Parsons and so 
on and so forth. 
We need to imagine systems, imagine democracy as a system in part because 
we need to think about divisions of labor among citizens and among the kinds of 
institutions that comprise the kinds of systems that we have today. 
 
Interviewer: When you talk about using different arrangements to accomplish 
the specific functions democracy requires, you mean that, in some ways, particular 
arrangements are more adequate and can realize different functions. In this sense, we 
don't apply the same basic requirements to some mechanisms that we apply to the 
others. Some spheres of a deliberative system will not be very deliberative. Others, will 
promote deliberation, but will not do it in a very equal basis. So we accept inequalities, 
secrecy, lack of discussion in specific areas in order to accomplish a fair deliberative 
system in a broader sense. It is sometimes difficult not to mention the critics to the 
functionalist approach or the way it allows to much inequality in order to get a better 
outcome of the system as a whole. Would it be the case of establishing some desirable 
results beforehand and only mathematically managing political institutions to 
accomplish these ends? Isn't it from the nature of democratic politics that the end of 
the political society should be opened to citizens' self-determination? How can the 
systemic perspective escape from such critics? 
 
Mark Warren: Let me answer the second question first. Systems theory, the 
kind that was re-imported into the American Political Science after World War II, had 
its origins in Talcott Parsons and his structural functionalism. The way systems 
theorists organized their thought – the systems theorists within this tradition – was by 
thinking about the kinds of functions that a society needs to accomplish in order to 
reproduce itself. 
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Now, in posing the question that way, structural functionalist systems theories 
reified society. They imagined that it was an organism that has certain kinds of 
functions to which citizens were subordinate, agents were subordinate, institutions 
were subordinate and so on. And what they did in thinking this way was to generate a 
kind of conservative ideology. That is, societies survive, they live on, they reproduce 
themselves because the pieces of a society are functional for the survival of a society. 
As you can see from this language, there’s a kind of biological analogy here too. 
It is as if society is an organism. You know the circulatory does some necessary 
functions, the organs do other necessary sorts of things and so on and so forth. But of 
course this is not what a society is. 
To move to a systems theory that doesn’t become in effect an organic sort of 
ideology, we need to think of functions as normative purposes. Things need to be done 
because we believe they should be done and we can justify they should be done. If we 
inject normative questions into systems theory in that way, then it is not a problem to 
think about systems and functions, specializations within systems. We’ve normatized 
it, and in normatizing it, we’ve de-ideologized the theory. We can ask the critical 
questions about whether a function should in fact be a part of a system. And when we 
do that, I think that there’s no objection, there’s no ideologically normative objection 
to moving back toward a systems theory and systems way of thinking. 
 
Interviewer: A democratic system faces at least two paradoxical impulses, 
often pushing it in opposite directions. At the same time that we claim for more 
inclusion, publicity and discussion, we need our institutions to get things done. The 
fiscal cliff in which the United States fell last year is probably a good example of how 
democracies can easily get into a gridlock and postpone the solutions of urgent 
problems, the outcomes of which can be really serious for its citizens. 
You’re involved with Jane Mansbridge and other leading scholars in a task force 
of the American Political Science Association entitled Negotiating Agreement: Getting 
Things Done in Democracies that have been dealing with the theoretical and practical 
consequences of impasse for contemporary democracies. 
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Another concern of the task force is to get a deeper understanding of how 
institutions can address conflict and the politicians can reach agreement on 
controversial moral and political issues. Some authors – I would mention Diana Mutz – 
argue that individuals are less likely to decided when exposed to different views from 
theirs. Would a trade-off, for instance, between inclusion and problem-solving take us 
back to elitist democracy? Is it possible to conciliate these two democratic masters, 
inclusion and deliberation, on the one side, and decision-making and problem-solving, 
on the other, without falling into a trade-off between the two? 
 
Mark Warren: This is one of the most important sets of questions that we now 
face. Let me begin by giving a kind of democratic theory answer to this, following from 
a kind of systems approach. 
One of the things that I have been arguing recently is that the political system 
really needs to do only three big things. But it has to do all of these three big things. It 
needs to include people, that is, to communicate their interest and their values to the 
political system. Secondly, it has to transform these voices, interests and values into 
collective will, or collective agenda. And then it needs to make decisions. Unless a 
system can make decisions, there’s no people that is capable of acting for itself, there's 
no society that can solve its own problems. So democracies need to have all of these 
moments. And where you have one kind of function crowding out another, you also 
are damaging democracy. 
Now, as to trade-offs. Of course, in most systems, there are trade-offs among 
and between these functions. But ideally we should be looking for political institutions 
that manage to convert inclusion into agendas and then manage to convert agendas 
into decisions. Some systems don’t do this very well. The American system, for 
instance, because it is built around checks and balances – because it’s essentially built 
as a guarantee against tyranny – is very gridlock-prone. It does a somewhat good job 
of inclusion, but it doesn’t do a very good job of transforming those inclusions into 
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agendas and then, of course, because of checks and balances, there’s no strong 
decision point. 
But there are other systems that are much better at accommodating 
proportional representation and parliamentary constitutional arrangements. These 
systems do a pretty good job of inclusion because in one sense people are 
represented, minority views and voices are more likely to have a voice in the collective 
decision-making body like a parliament. But, in other, because powers are somewhat 
concentrated, there are points of decision. And so the inclusions can be converted 
through parliamentary decisions, deliberations can be transformed into agendas, the 
agendas can be converted into decisions, and these decisions can then reflect back 
into society. Now, the countries that have done a pretty good job of making these 
sorts of conversions work – Denmark would be a case in point – also have many, many 
points of inclusion and inflection, many points of absorption, and then many points in 
which deliberations continue to convert these inclusions into agendas, many points of 
publicity and so, when decisions are finally taken, they’re relatively inclusive decisions 
that benefit from a high degree of legitimacy because there’s been a lot of processes 
that happened in advance of the decisions. 
So, I guess what I’d say about the question of trade-offs is that there are some 
kinds of systems, like the American system, that generate trade-offs. But these are not 
necessary. They’re institutionally contingent trade-offs. We could have better 
institutions or reform the institutions that we have so that they would work better or 
supplement them with different kinds of devices, and if we could do that in the right 
way, then the trade-offs would be much less harmful. 
 
Interviewer: In what point is the task force right now? Are there workshops 
planned for the future? 
 
Mark Warren: The task force needs to deliver a draft report on August 20th 
2013, but the report will go through a number of revisions after the delivery. And then 
it will be disseminated broadly in the hopes that it will generate some publicity and 
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some new research agendas, put this kind of problem on the agenda of political 
scientists and of political systems in the way that it probably needs to be. 
 
Interviewer: There is another issue related to the task force that I would like to 
explore. It seems to me, from some events I've attended in Canada, and specially from 
one of the workshops promoted by APSA and UBC's Centre for the Study of 
Democratic Institutions (CSDI), that political scientists in North America have the 
concern of engaging in public debate. In the event I'm mentioning, the director of the 
CSDI, Professor Max Cameron, organized a meeting in which many researchers joined 
politicians, think-tanks and journalists to discuss practical issues related, among other 
things, with how real political systems can promoted the ideals that are constantly 
discussed by Political Theory. One thing that impressed me is the way political 
scientists in general and political theorists in particular engage in public debate and try 
to make their voices heard by the political system. This is something I don’t really see 
happening in Brazil. 
 
Mark Warren: The Canadian system and the US systems are different systems 
with different histories. The positive side of Canada, the Canadian system is still 
relatively young as compared to the American system and relatively in flux. So there 
are probably more points of entry for institutional reform in Canada. That said, Canada 
inherited a very old system and, in some ways, a not very good system, the British 
Westminster system. And it produces governments that are actually quite closed to 
outside influence. They tend to become relatively autocratic, relatively secretive and 
relatively authoritarian, and it is almost always the case that governments in Canada 
last a couple of elections, maybe more. And then they are pushed aside by relatively 
strong forces of civil society as they begin to lose touch. 
So we do have a tradition of political debate and a tradition of intellectual 
influence. It doesn’t interface very well with the system of government that we have. 
But the US system is… you know, each system has its own pathologies. The US system 
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is pluralistic, yet, it favors well-organized interests. Its pluralism does leave it open to a 
relatively well-organized intellectual influence. In Washington the influence tends to 
work through think-tanks. And this is something that the US system has that the 
Canadian system does not – Brookings and the Carnegie and the Indo-American 
Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute on the conservative side and so on. 
So there are conduits, or points of translations, institutionalized points of translation 
between academic thinking in Political Science and at least some of the things that 
penetrate government and governance in the US. 
That said, that is only part of the picture and the gridlock-prone nature of the 
system can keep most good ideas from having much of an impact on policy for most of 
the time. 
 
Interviewer: Another issue that called my attention in the workshop, now 
thinking more about the theoretical questions elaborated, is that some of the 
problems highlighted there were, in the last 10 or 15 years, carefully debated within 
deliberative theory. I would mention, for example, the problem of self-interest and 
bias in negotiation, the question of trust, and the controversy between secrecy and 
publicity: these were all part of the deliberativists' agenda, and deliberative theory 
presented a very strong defense of publicity, of public deliberation etc. Do you think 
the concerns brought up by the workshop as well as the tentative responses being 
elaborated represent a sort of a departure from discursive ways of dealing with 
political conflict? 
 
Mark Warren: The task force drew pretty heavily on deliberative democratic 
theory. And it did so, in part, because, I think, of a warranted faith that if things are 
going to get done in a democracy, they’re going to be done in part because people are 
able to talk, to bargain, to appreciate where other people are coming from, to 
compromise. Now, all of these said, one weakness of deliberative democratic theory – 
this is again a weakness of models-based thinking – is that it focuses primarily on the 
second task of the three tasks that I've mentioned that are necessary for the political 
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system to count as democratic, that is inclusion, collective will formation and decision-
making. 
Deliberative democratic theory hasn’t added much to the theory of decision-
making and, for that reason, has not counted as a strong response to problems of 
gridlock, which tend to occur at the points of decision-making. But, anyway, we really 
hope that the task force will contextualize the contributions of deliberative democratic 
theory within problems of decision-making and, in this way, help to upgrade and 
further develop the theory of deliberative democracy. 
 
Interviewer: Now moving back to practical concerns related to the theoretical 
discussion we're doing here, I would like to discuss about some recent events we have 
been following in contemporary democracies. Over the last two or three years we have 
been seeing citizens all over the world discontent with the isolation of the political 
system from their control, claiming for greater participation in collective decisions. 
Many countries, by initiative of the government, or through direct involvement of civil 
society organizations, have been developing innovative forms of participatory 
governance. Sometimes, these arrangements complement the work of traditional 
political institutions; sometimes, they control or compete with traditional forms of 
democratic organization. From the perspective of the systemic approach, what would 
be the functions of these new institutions, or what are the functions these new 
institutions can perform in furthering democratization? And what tasks are they 
incapable of accomplishing? 
 
Mark Warren: We’re seeing quite a political revolution in the broad area of 
participatory governance. To some degree, I think the big picture in participatory 
governance is that the participation is an elite response to societies that have become 
stronger and stronger, and more self-confident, and more capable of generating 
advocacy, pressure, veto points and so on. 
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Many governments responded with new forms of inclusion, new forms of 
participation. The incentives are pretty often the incentives to avoid gridlock and veto. 
But one of the consequences is that these kinds of incentives can produce a lot of 
innovation in participatory governance. 
One of the most interesting developments over the last couple of decades is 
that a lot of the innovations in participatory governance have come not through 
electoral democracy, but rather, through administration. Governance issues, beginning 
in Europe and the US in the 1960s and in Vancouver and Toronto, and Australia 
beginning with urban planning, moving into problems of land use and environmental 
areas in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and then extending to other areas of 
governance in the 1990s. 
Very often – to come back to the systems question – the kinds of participatory 
innovations that we’ve seen are innovations that tend to happen within relatively 
established political systems, where there’s some capacity for uptake decision-making 
in the administration. So it is not that participatory innovations are weak. But they are 
more successful where they are complemented, shall we say, by civil society 
organization, on one hand, and administrative capacity, established state 
administrative capacity, on the other. And that’s, I think, something we’re going to see 
more and more of as political systems evolve. 
 
Interviewer: You're currently engaged in an initiative that intends to provide a 
platform for researchers and practitioners all over the world to exchange experiences 
and compare the ability of participatory arrangements to further democratization. Can 
you tell us a little bit about Participedia? 
 
Mark Warren: Participedia is a response to – and if we think about this from 
the standpoint of Political Science – an academic problem, which is that in Political 
Science we know a lot about electoral systems, we know about executive branch 
agencies, because these things have been around for a long time. But the new forms of 
participation, these participatory innovations that we’ve seen develop over the last 
few decades, and especially of over the last decade, the landscape is quite new and we 
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don’t really know what it looks like. We have lots of case studies. We have anecdotes 
and so on and so forth, but we don’t have good maps of all of the participatory 
innovations. And just to give you an idea of the variety, there are probably around a 
hundred and fifty – maybe two hundred, maybe more – named and branded kinds of 
processes: citizens’ juries and citizens’ assemblies, deliberative polls and Socrates’ 
Cafés. 
Participedia is an attempt to have a structured platform that would begin to 
map this very pluralistic and varied domain of participatory governance. And to do so 
in a way that is more powerful than even a good team of Political Science researchers 
could bring to this problem. It consists of an Internet platform that asks for a 
structured article on a case, and then, behind that, there are a lot of data to be 
inserted into the system. And when the platform is fully built, we will be getting a 
hundred and fifty or two hundred data points associated with every case. And these 
data points will help us to both sort and explain the cases in the different types, but 
also to explain why some kinds of processes are good for some types of issues and 
good for accomplishing some kinds of goals under the conditions under which it’s 
operating. That is, we hope that Participedia will begin to give us a database to do 
good comparative research on participatory innovations, as we can do on more 
traditional political institutions. 
 
Interviewer: I would say that the area of Political Science is the one within 
social sciences that deals more closely with controversial and unstable issues related 
to the State and distribution of power, social justice, etc. In a word, we are constantly 
mobilized by society’s changing understanding of itself; countries as distinct as the USA 
and Turkey, Brazil and Spain have been facing an increase in citizens’ dissatisfaction 
with the political order and its outcomes. The dissatisfaction movements caught by 
surprise most of us, citizens and political scientists. In a very speculative exercise, could 
you, please, try to list the questions related the recent events you think are and will be 
motivating political theorists in the years to come? 
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Mark Warren: I think that there are two forces at work that are producing 
these developments. One is the development of new, more confident, better 
organized citizens. The development of advocacy capacities within civil society; the 
learning about how to advocate, how to organize across countries, these are quite 
important factors. 
The other thing I would say is that we’re seeing these movements in countries 
where, although they are mostly electoral democracies, are not very good electoral 
democracies, they’re not highly responsive. For one thing there is a perception of 
relatively high levels of corruption. There’s also a certain amount of elite closure. So I 
think the combination of these two things, the post modernization of society and the 
increasing confidence of civil society combined with relatively rigid, not very 
responsive governments. That’s what seems to be producing the protests 
concomitantly from Quebec, which in Canada used to be a relatively corrupt province, 
to Spain, to Greece, to Turkey, to Brazil. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think there is a reaction in these movements against the 
secrecy in political affairs and, somehow related to this, against the control that the 
markets and big corporations have over politics? 
 
Mark Warren: The movements are certainly calling for new sorts of inclusion 
and responsiveness, and it surely starts with the perception of the degree that 
powerful economic actors develop alignments with political elites, which is a hazard in 
any market-focused capital system; and to the extent that that occurs and that the 
population realizes that decision making processes are being co-opted by these actors 
that are, by definition, unresponsive, the movements, of course, are targeting that 
type of alignment. 
 
Interviewer: These movements have somewhat surprised all of us. Even 
politicians who must react quite immediately to such events are not being able to 
react adequately, what to say about Political Science. Do you see any reactions within 
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our field to these movements and to these new forms of protests that are related to 
social media and new forms of communication? 
 
Mark Warren: Political science is always slow to react because it’s primarily an 
academic profession, and only secondarily a political profession. It takes time to think, 
to explain, to deal with studies, to figure out what’s going on. It’s more the job of 
public intellectuals, some of them descendant from the academic field, to give on-the-
spot interpretations. Now, that said, from a Political Science standpoint, many of these 
protests are not that surprising. We have good social movement theory, good 
structural theories dealing with the pressure points within the political systems. And, 
again to some degree, these theories are good in a generic way in trying to explain 
what’s going on. 
Of course, no general theory is going to be able to explain the particular 
triggers for these movements. The political scientists would not have been able to 
predict that an increase in bus fares would set off such important protests, or that a 
particular proposal to destroy a public park in Turkey would set off demonstrations 
there. But the underline structural tensions, that’s something political scientists are 
good at thinking about. 
I think there will be more and more academic reactions. One of the things that 
is probably new about these protests, these developments, is that there is quite a bit 
of learning across the movements. And a learning that certainly has been enabled by 
the Internet, also enabled by more mobility, more globalization, more movement of 
students from one country to another. These are all relatively new things, and that’s 
one of the interesting effects of not just the new technologies but more generally of 
globalization. I think political scientists and other scholars will sooner or later 
incorporate these variables and try to produce relevant research of these movements. 
